This paper introduces a framework to capture previously intractable optimization constraints and transform them to a mixed-integer linear program, through the use of neural networks. We encode the feasible space of optimization problems characterized by both tractable and intractable constraints, e.g. differential equations, to a neural network. Leveraging an exact mixed-integer reformulation of neural networks, we solve mixed-integer linear programs that accurately approximate solutions to the originally intractable non-linear optimization problem. We apply our methods to the AC optimal power flow problem (AC-OPF), where directly including dynamic security constraints renders the AC-OPF intractable. Our proposed approach has the potential to be significantly more scalable than traditional approaches. We demonstrate our approach for power system operation considering N-1 security and small-signal stability, showing how it can efficiently obtain cost-optimal solutions which at the same time satisfy both static and dynamic security constraints.
I. INTRODUCTION A. Motivation
In a wide range of optimization problems, especially related to physical systems, the feasible space is characterized by differential equations and other intractable constraints [1] . Inspired by power system operation, this paper uses the AC optimal power flow (AC-OPF) problem with dynamic security constraints as a guiding example to introduce a framework that efficiently captures previously intractable constraints and transforms them to a mixed-integer linear program, through the use of neural networks. More specifically, we use neural networks to encode the previously intractable feasible space, and through an exact transformation we convert them to a set of linear constraints with binary variables that can be integrated to an equivalent mixedinteger linear problem (MILP).
Power system security assessment is among the most fundamental functions of power system operators. With growing uncertainty both in generation and demand, the complexity of this task further increases, necessitating the development of new approaches [2] . In power systems, the AC optimal power flow (AC-OPF) is an essential tool for cost-optimal and secure power system operation [3] . The non-convex AC-OPF problem minimizes an objective function (e.g. generation cost) subject to steady-state operational constraints (on e.g. voltage magnitudes and transmission line A. Venzke, D. T. Viola, J. Mermet-Guyennet, G. S. Misyris and S. Chatzivasileiadis are with the Department of Electrical Engineering, Technical University of Denmark, 2800 Kgs. Lyngby, Denmark e-mail: {andven, s182215, jamg, gmisy, spchatz}@elektro.dtu.dk. flows). While the obtained generation dispatch from the AC-OPF solution ensures compliance with static security criteria such as N-1 security, the dispatch additionally needs to comply with dynamic security criteria such as small-signal or transient stability. However, directly including dynamic security constraints renders the AC-OPF problem intractable [4] . To obtain solutions which satisfy both static and dynamic security criteria, we propose a novel framework using neural networks to encode dynamic security constrained AC-OPF to MILPs.
B. Literature Review
In literature, a range of works [5] - [8] have proposed iterative approaches and approximations to account for dynamic security constraints in AC-OPF problems. For a comprehensive review please refer to [4] . The work in [5] considers transient stability by discretizing a simplified formulation of the power system dynamics and proposes an iterative solution scheme. Alternatively, to include transient stability constraints, the work in [6] proposes a hybrid solution approach using evolutionary algorithms. The work in [7] addresses voltage stability and proposes a threelevel hierarchical scheme to identify suitable preventive and corrective control actions. To approximate the small-signal stability criterion, the work in [8] linearizes the system state around a given operating point and includes the eigenvalue sensitivities in the AC-OPF problem. While the majority of these approaches are tailored to a specific dynamic stability criterion and require to iteratively solve non-linear programs (NLPs), in this paper we propose a general framework which allows us to encode any security criterion.
A range of machine learning approaches have been proposed to learn optimal solutions to the AC-OPF problem [9] , [10] and approximations thereof such as the DC-OPF problem [11] - [16] , without considering dynamic security constraints. The work in [9] compares different machine learning approaches and finds that neural networks achieve the best performance. To predict optimal solutions to AC-OPF problems, the work in [10] trains deep neural networks and penalizes constraints violations. For the DC-OPF approximation, the work in [11] trains deep neural networks as well, achieving a speed-up of two orders of magnitude compared to conventional methods. The same authors extend this work in [12] to account for static security constraints. Instead of directly learning the optimal solutions, the works in [13] - [16] predict the set of active constraints for the DC-OPF approximation. Note that the DC-OPF approximation neglects reactive power, voltage magnitudes and losses and can lead to substantial errors [17] . While these approaches demonstrate substantial computational speed-up compared to conventional solvers, they do not account for dynamic security criteria, and rely on a large training dataset of computed optimal solutions to the AC-OPF problem. Obtaining such a dataset is computationally prohibitive for dynamic securityconstrained AC-OPF.
Using machine learning techniques for static and dynamic security assessment has been explored in literature (e.g. [18] - [20] ), for a comprehensive survey please refer to [21] . The main area of application has been the screening of a large number of operating points with respect to different security criteria. Several works have shown that the proposed machine learning methods including neural networks require only a fraction of the computational time for conventional methods. Fewer works [22] - [24] explored using machine learning techniques to directly include dynamic security constraints in AC-OPF problems. The work in [22] proposed ensemble decision trees to identify corrective actions to satisfy security criteria. Embedding the decision trees in an AC-OPF framework requires to solve computationally highly expensive mixed-integer non-linear problems (MINLPs). To address computational tractability, the work in [23] proposed a second-order cone relaxation of the AC-OPF to relax the MINLP to a mixed-integer second-order cone program (MISOCP). This, however, does not guarantee feasibility of the obtained solution in case the relaxation is inexact. The work in [24] uses a non-linear representation of neural networks with one single hidden layer to represent the stability boundary in the AC-OPF problem. Instead of solving computationally expensive NLPs or MINLPs, we propose a novel framework using neural networks to encode the dynamic security constrained AC-OPF to MILPs.
C. Main Contributions
The main contributions of our work are: 1) Using classification neural networks we encode the feasible space of AC-OPF problems including any type of static and dynamic security criteria. 2) Leveraging a mixed-integer linear reformulation of the trained neural network and a systematic iterative procedure to include non-linear equality constraints, we accurately approximate cost-optimal solutions to the original intractable AC-OPF problems. 3) We introduce a method to trade-off conservativeness of the neural network prediction with cost-optimality, ensuring feasibility of the obtained solutions. 4) Considering both N-1 security and small-signal stability, and using an IEEE 14 bus system, we demonstrate how the proposed approach allows to obtain costoptimal solutions which at the same time satisfy both static and dynamic security constraints.
D. Outline
The structure of this paper is as follows: In Section II, we formulate optimization problems with intractable dynamic security constraints including the dynamic security-constrained AC optimal power flow. In Section III, we encode the feasible space using neural networks, state the mixed-integer linear reformulation of the trained neural network, and introduce efficient methods to include equality constraints and to ensure feasibility. In Section IV, we demonstrate our methods using an IEEE 14 bus system and considering both N-1 security and small-signal stability. Section V concludes. The code to reproduce all reported results is available online [25] .
II. NON-LINEAR OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS WITH DYNAMIC SECURITY CONSTRAINTS A. General Formulation
We consider the following class of non-linear optimization problems with intractable dynamic constraints:
The variables are split into state variables x and control variables u which are constrained to the sets X and U, respectively. The objective function is denoted with f in (1) .
There is a number of m and n non-linear inequality and equality constraints g and h, respectively. The l number of constraints φ in (4) encode dynamic security constraints (e.g. based on differential equations) and are intractable. While the non-linear optimization problem (1)-(3) can be solved using a non-linear solver, the addition of the constraints in (4) renders the optimization problem intractable. Note that for given fixed system state (x, u) we can determine computationally efficiently whether it belongs to set S satisfying dynamic constraints, i.e. is feasible or infeasible. One possible solution strategy is to follow an iterative approach where the optimization problem (1)-(3) is solved first, and then if constraint (4) is violated a nearby solution is identified which satisfies (4). This has several drawbacks including that this procedure does not guarantee the recovery of a solution that is feasible to the original problem, and the feasibility recovery procedure does not consider optimality of the solution. In the following, using power system operation as a guiding example, we will present an approach that allows to directly approximate a high-quality solution to (1)-(4) by solving mixed-integer linear programs instead.
B. Application to AC Optimal Power Flow (AC-OPF)
In the following, we consider the AC-OPF problem with combined N-1 security and small-signal stability criteria as guiding example. Note that our proposed methodology is general and can include any static or dynamic security criteria. The AC-OPF problem optimizes the operation of a power grid consisting of a set of N buses connected by a set of L lines. A subset of the set of N buses has a generator connected and is denoted with G. The variables are the vectors of active and reactive power injections p and q, the voltage magnitudes v and voltage angles θ. Each of these vectors have the size n × 1, where n is the number of buses in the set N . The control variables u are the active power injections and voltage set-points of generators p g and v g , i.e. the entries in p and q that correspond to the buses in the set G. If the control variables are fixed, the remaining state variables can be identified by solving an AC power flow, i.e. solving a system of non-linear equations [26] . To satisfy the N-1 security criterion, the identified control variables u must lead to a power system state which complies with the operational constraints for a set of line outages. We denote this set with C, with the first element C 1 = {0} corresponding to the intact system state. The superscript 'c' in (6)- (13) denotes the corresponding outaged system state and the superscript '0' the intact system state. To ensure smallsignal stability, we analyze the stability of the linearization of the power system dynamics around the current operating point [27] . The system matrix A describes the linearized system dynamics as function of the current operating point defined by (p, q, v, θ). To satisfy the small-signal stability criterion, the minimum damping ratio associated with the eigenvalues λ of A has to be larger than
Finally, we formulate the N-1 security and small-signal stability constrained AC-OPF:
The objective function in (5) minimizes the cost of the system generation for the intact system state. All inequality and equality constraints (6)-(13) have to hold for the intact system state and each contingency in C. The inequality constraints in (6)-(8) define minimum and maximum limits on active and reactive power injections and voltage magnitudes. The inequality constraint in (9) bounds the absolute apparent branch flow s line for each line in L. The equality constraint in (10) enforces the AC power flow balance s balance at each bus N in the system. For a detailed mathematical description of the apparent branch flow and the AC power flow balance, for brevity, please refer to [3] . We consider preventive control for N-1 security defined in (11), i.e. the generator active power set-points and voltage set-points remain fixed if a line outage occurs. In (12) the term ν denotes the right hand eigenvectors of the system matrix A. Note that the small-signal stability constraints (12)-(13) have to hold for each considered line outage in set C. Adding the small-signal stability constraints in (12)-(13) increases the non-linearity and computational complexity of the optimization problem substantially, rendering it intractable and requiring iterative solution approaches [8] . In the following, we introduce a framework which allows to directly approximate costoptimal solutions to (5)- (13) .
III. METHODOLOGY TO ACCURATELY APPROXIMATE COST-OPTIMAL AND FEASIBLE SOLUTIONS A. Encoding Feasible Space using Neural Networks
We denote the feasible space F of the optimization problem (1)-(4) as: F := {x ∈ X and u ∈ U satisfy (2)-(4)}. As first step, we train a classification neural network which takes the control variables u ∈ U as input and predicts whether there exists state variables x ∈ X such that the resulting operating point is in the feasible space (
The general architecture of the classification neural network is illustrated in Fig. 1 . The neural network is defined by a number K of fully-connected hidden layers, that each consist of N k number of neurons with k = 1, ..., K. The neural network input vector u has dimension N 0 × 1 and the output vector z has dimension N K+1 × 1. Here, the dimension of z is 2 × 1, as we consider binary classification. The input to each layerŷ k is defined as:ŷ
where y 0 = u is the input to the neural network. The weight matrices W k have dimensions N k+1 ×N k and the bias vector b has dimension N k+1 × 1. Each neuron in the hidden layer applies a non-linear activation function to the input. Here, we assume the ReLU activation function:
The ReLU activation function in (15) outputs 0 if the input y is negative, otherwise it propagates the inputŷ. Note that the max operator is applied element-wise to the vectorŷ k . The majority of recent neural network applications uses the ReLU function as activation function as it has been found to accelerate neural network training [28] . The output of the neural network is:
For binary classification, based on a comparison of the magnitude of the neural network output, we can either classify the input as belonging to the first class z 1 ≥ z 2 or the second class z 2 > z 1 . Here, the first class z 1 ≥ z 2 corresponds to the prediction that the input is in the feasible space u ∈ F, and the second class z 2 > z 1 to the prediction that the input is not in the feasible space u / ∈ F. To train the neural network a dataset of labeled samples is required. The performance of the neural network highly depends on the quality of the dataset used.To encode the feasible space F of a general optimization problem (1)-(4), we sample u from the set U and determine whether the sample is feasible or not. For the application to the N-1 security and small-signal stability constrained AC-OPF in (5)-(13) this requires to sample u = [p 0 g v 0 g ] T from within the limits defined in (6)- (8) , and then test feasibility with respect to all constraints (6)- (13) . If available, historical data of secure operating points can be used by the transmission system operator in conjunction with dataset creation methods. To achieve satisfactory neural network performance, the goal of the dataset creation is to create a balanced dataset of feasible and infeasible operating points which at the same time describe the feasibility boundary in detail. This is particularly important in AC-OPF applications as large parts of the possible sampling space lead to infeasible operating points [29] . While the dataset creation is not the scope of this work, several approaches [29] - [31] focus on efficient methods to create datasets.
Before training of the neural network, the dataset is split into a training and test data set. During training of classification networks, the cross-entropy loss function is minimized using stochastic gradient descent [32] . This penalizes the deviation between the predicted and true label of the training dataset. The weight matrices W and biases b are updated at each iteration of the training to minimize the loss function. After training, the generalization capability of the neural network is evaluated by calculating the accuracy and other relevant metrics on the unseen test data set.
B. Exact Mixed-Integer Reformulation of Trained Neural Network
With the goal of using the trained neural network in an optimization framework, following the work in [33] , we first need to reformulate the maximum operator in (15) using binary variables b k ∈ 0, 1 N k for all k = 1, ..., K:
We introduce one binary variable for each neuron in the hidden layers of the neural network. In case the input to the neuron isŷ ≤ 0 then the corresponding binary variable is 0 and (17c) and (17d) constrain the neuron output y k to 0. Conversely, if the input to the neuron isŷ ≥ 0, then the binary variable is 1 and (17a) and (17b) constrain the neuron output y k to the inputŷ k . Note that the minimum and maximum bounds on the neuron outputŷ min andŷ max have to be chosen large enough to not be binding and as small as possible to facilitate tight bounds for the mixedinteger solver. We compute suitable bounds using interval arithmetic [33] . To maintain scalability of the resulting MILP, several approaches have been proposed in literature including weight and ReLU pruning [34] . Here, we follow [34] and prune weight matrices W during training, i.e. we gradually enforce a defined share of entries to be zero.
C. Mixed-Integer Non-Linear Approximation
Based on the exact mixed-integer reformulation of the trained neural network with (14) , (16) and (17a)-(17e), we can approximate solutions to the intractable problem (5)-(13) by solving the following tractable mixed-integer non-linear optimization problem instead:
s balance (p 0 , q 0 , v 0 , θ 0 ) = 0 (21)
The inequality constraints (19)- (20) provide upper and lower bounds on the control variables u = [p 0 g v 0 g ] T . For the intact system state, (21) ensures the non-linear AC power balance for each bus. The exact mixed-integer reformulation of the neural network is given in (22)- (25) . The constraint on the neural network output z in (26) ensures that the neural network predicts that the input [p 0 g v 0 g ] belongs to the feasible space F of the original problem in (5)- (13) . Note that the neural network (22)-(26) encodes all constraints related to N-1 security and small-signal stability, and eliminates all related optimization variables. The remaining non-linear constraint in (21) enforces the non-linear AC power flow balance for the intact system state and requires to maintain the state variables for the intact system state only. While the number of optimization variables in (18)- (26) has been substantially reduced compared to (5)-(13), the resulting optimization problem is a mixed-integer non-linear problem, which are in general hard to solve. In the following, we will propose a systematic procedure to handle the non-linear equality constraint in (21) .
D. Mixed-Integer Linear Approximation
The non-linear AC power flow equations described by the nodal power balance in (21) can be summed over all buses. Then, we take the real part and write the summed active power balance as:
The first term G p 0 g is the sum of active power generation and the second term N p 0 d the sum of the active power loading of the system where the parameter p 0 d represent the active power load at each bus in N . The third term p losses encapsulates the non-linearity and represents the active power losses. We propose to use an iterative linear approximation of the third non-linear term with a first-order Taylor expansion. At iteration i + 1, we approximate (27) as:
The notation | i is shorthand for evaluated at the operating point of the i-th iteration, i.e. at (p 0 , q 0 , v 0 , θ 0 )| i . At the current operating point, we evaluate the value of the losses p losses | i and the gradients with respect to the active generator dispatch δplosses δp 0 g | i and the generator voltages δplosses δv 0 g | i , respectively. Then, we approximate the value of the losses as a function of both the active generator dispatch and the generator voltages using the first-order Taylor expansion.
The iterative scheme has the following steps. To initialize for iteration i = 0, we linearize around a known operating point (p 0 , q 0 , v 0 , θ 0 )| i=0 , e.g. the solution to the AC-OPF or N-1 security-constrained AC-OPF problem. Then, we solve the following mixed-integer linear program for iteration i:
s.t. (19) , (20) , (22) − (26), (28) 
By iteratively linearizing the non-linear equation in (21), we solve MILPs instead of MINLPs. MILPs can be solved at a fraction of the time required for MINLPs as the convexity of the problem without integer variables allows for a significantly improved pruning of the branch-and-bound procedure. Based on the result of this optimization problem, we subsequently run an AC power flow for the intact system state to recover the full power system state and the losses. The iterative scheme converges if the change between the active power losses between iteration i and i − 1 is below a defined threshold ρ: plosses|i−plosses|i−1 plosses|i ≤ ρ. Otherwise, we resolve (29)-(30) with the loss parameters in (28) updated. In Section IV-B, we demonstrate fast convergence of this method.
E. Ensuring Feasibility of Solutions
The classification neural network is trained on a finite number of data samples and with a finite number of neurons. As a result, there might be a mismatch between the prediction of the feasibility boundary and the actual true feasibility boundary. This could lead to falsely identifying an operating point as feasible while it is in fact not feasible. Note that feasibility refers to satisfication of both static and dynamic security criteria. To control the conservativeness of the neural network prediction we introduce an additional constant factor in the classification and replace (26) in the MILP formulation Illustrative reduction of predicted feasible space: Red dots are predicted infeasible, blue dots are predicted feasible. The grey area represents the true feasible space. The black dotted line represents the predicted feasibility boundary. The green dotted line is the predicted feasibility boundary after introducing a suitable in the classification decision z 1 ≥ z 2 + .
(29)-(29) with:
Adding the term to the right hand side in (31) effectively shrinks the size of the predicted feasible space. This reduces the risk that operating points close to the feasibility boundary are falsely classified as feasible. At the same time, this can lead to an increase of the cost of operation, i.e. there is a trade-off between ensuring feasibility and optimality. In Fig. 2 we illustrate the reduction of the predicted feasible space by introducing . In Section IV-B, we quantify in detail the trade-off between ensuring feasibility and obtaining a cost-optimal solution.
IV. SIMULATION AND RESULTS
In the following, we demonstrate our proposed methodology using an IEEE 14-bus system and considering combined N-1 security and small-signal stability as security criteria. The code to reproduce all reported results is available online [25] .
A. Simulation Setup
As test case, we use the IEEE 14-bus system from [35] consisting of 5 generators, 11 loads and 20 lines with the following modifications: For the N-1 security criterion, we consider all possible line outages except of the lines connecting buses 7 to 8 and 6 to 13, similar to previous works [29] . Including these outages would render the problem infeasible. Furthermore, we enlarge the apparent branch flow limits in (9) by 30% and the reactive power generator limits in (7) by 25% to be able to obtain feasible solutions. To build the system matrix A of the small signal stability model in (12) , we use a tenth-order synchronous machine model and follow standard modeling procedures outlined in [27] . We use Mathematica [36] to derive the small signal model symbolically, MATPOWER AC power flows to initialize the system matrix [35] , and Matlab [37] to compute its eigenvalues and damping ratio, and assess the small-signal stability for each operating point and contingency. Note that we require a minimum damping ratio γ min of 3%.
The control variables are generator active power set-points u = p 0 g and the voltage set-points are assumed to be fixed v 0 g = [1.06, 1.045, 1.01, 1.02, 1.01].
To create the dataset of labeled operating points, we discretize the set U within the minimum and maximum generator limits in (19) . For each sample, we compute the feasibility w.r.t. combined N-1 security and small-signal stability. As large parts of this set lead to infeasible solutions, we resample around identified feasible solutions. As a result, we obtain a dataset of 36'144 datapoints with 50.0% feasible and 50.0% infeasible samples. We split the dataset into 80% training and 20% test set and train a neural network with 3 hidden layers and 50 neurons in each hidden layer using TensorFlow [32] . During training, we gradually increase the enforced sparsity of the weight matrices to 70%, i.e. 70% of the entries of W have to be zero. This increases the tractability of the resulting MILPs significantly [34] . Finally, we obtain a trained neural network with a predictive accuracy of 99.3% on the test dataset, showing good generalization capability of the neural network.
We formulate the mixed-integer linear programs (29)-(30) in YALMIP [38] and solve it using Gurobi [39] . We evaluate the performance of our methodology for 125 random objective functions. For these we draw random linear cost coefficients for each of the five generators between 5 $ MW and 20 $ MW using Latin hypercube sampling. We initialize the loss approximation in (28) with the solution to the AC-OPF for each random cost function. The computational experiments are run on a standard laptop.
B. Simulation Results
In Table I , we compare the solutions to AC-OPF and N-1 security constrained AC-OPF (both solved using MAT-POWER and IPOPT [40] ) with our proposed approach encoding the feasible space to MILPs in terms of problem formulation and type, generation cost, solver time and share of feasible instances for 125 instances with random cost functions. Both the AC-OPF and N-1 security constrained AC-OPF do not return a feasible solution for 64.8% of the 125 random test instances, requiring computationally expensive post-processing. Following our proposed approach, for a value of = 0, we decrease this share to 44.0%. Introducing a value of = 8 in the classification decision of the neural network in (31) allows us to obtain feasible solutions for all test instances, i.e. all obtained solutions satisfy N-1 security and small-signal stability criteria. Note that we select the value of = 8 based on a sensitivity analysis that we explain in detail in the following paragraphs. The iterative loss approximation in (28) with ρ = 1% converges rapidly within 1.04 iterations on average and at most 2. This shows good performance of the proposed approach to handle the equality constraint.
In Table I , the average cost increase of including N-1 security evaluates to 5.7%, and including small-signal stability leads to an additional increase of 2.1% which is expected. Notably, the additional cost increase by introducing a value of = 8, i.e. increasing the conservativeness of the neural network prediction, evaluates only to 0.5%, while it increases the share of feasible instances from 56.0% to 100%. On average, each MILP instance solves in 0.22 s and 0.12 s for = 0 and = 10, respectively, and is comparable to the computational time of 0.15 s of solving N-1 security constrained AC-OPF which cannot, however, handle the small-signal stability constraints, or any other dynamic security constraints. Note that in terms of scalability, our proposed approach requires only to include the control variables of the intact system state, and depends mainly on the tractability of the MILP reformulation of the neural network. The complexity of N-1 security constrained AC-OPF increases exponentially for large scale instances requiring iterative solution schemes [4] . In Fig. 3 we show the resulting generator dispatch for 125 random cost functions obtained by solving the MILPs. It can be noted that the dispatch of generators 1-3 varies with changing cost functions, while the dispatch of generators 4 and 5 remains constant.
To explore the trade-off between conservativeness of the neural network boundary prediction (through increasing ) and the resulting generation cost increase, Fig. 4 shows the share of feasible instances and the average objective value for ranging from 0 to 10. It can be noted that the average cost has a small linear increase with , reaching at most 0.7% increase for = 10. The share of feasible instances increases in two jumps from = 2 to 3 (from 56.0 % to 80.8%) and from = 7 to 8, from 82.4% to 100%. In addition, for the 
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True Positive Rate (TPR) Fig. 5 . For the dataset of 36'144 samples, accuracy, true positive rate (TPR) and true negative rate (TNR) of the neural network are shown for different values of . TPR and TNR denote the share of feasible and not feasible samples that are correctly predicted as feasible and not feasible, respectively. Note that these are independent of the random cost function.
full dataset of 36'144 samples, Fig. 5 shows the accuracy, the true positive rate (TPR) and the true negative rate (TNR) for different values of . TPR and TNR denote the share of feasible and not feasible samples that are correctly predicted as feasible and not feasible, respectively. It can be observed that for = 3 the TNR increases to 100%, i.e. no infeasible sample in the full training and test dataset is classified falsely as feasible. To obtain a share of 100% feasible solutions to the 125 random objective functions, the value of needs to be increased further to 8 (as shown in Fig. 4 ), resulting to a neural network accuracy of 93.3%. As an alternative to the proposed heuristic of identifying , our future work is directed towards robust retraining of neural networks [41] .
V. CONCLUSION
We introduce a framework that can efficiently capture previously intractable optimization constraints and transform them to a mixed-integer linear program, through the use of neural networks. First, we encode the feasible space which is characterized by both tractable and intractable constraints, e.g. constraints based on differential equations, to a neural network. Leveraging an exact mixed-integer reformulation of the trained neural network, and an efficient method to include non-linear equality constraints, we solve mixed-integer linear programs that can efficiently approximate non-linear optimization programs with previously intractable constraints. We apply our methods to the AC optimal power flow problem with dynamic security constraints. For an IEEE 14-bus system, and considering a combination of N-1 security and small-signal stability, we demonstrate how the proposed approach allows to obtain cost-optimal solutions which at the same time satisfy both static and dynamic security constraints. Future work is directed towards utilizing efficient dataset creation methods [29] - [31] and increasing robustness of classification neural networks [41] to boost the applicability of this approach.
